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IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
In the Matter of the Adoption of: 
JASON MICHAEL WRIGHT, 
a minor. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Case No. 15272 
On the lOth day of February, 1977, a final Decree of Adoption 
was entered in the above entitled matter by the Third Judicial District 
Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable J. E. 
BANKS, Judge presiding. Appellant filed a Motion to Set Aside the 
Decree of Adoption and that motion was heard on the lOth day of March, 
1977, at which time the Court took the motion under advisement, 
pending further testimony. On the 25th day of March, 1977, after hear-
ing testimony of both the natural mother and the Appellant, the Court 
entered an Order setting aside the final Decree of Adoption previously 
granted. Further testimony then was taken on the 25th day of March, 
1977, concerning the question of abandonment by the Appellant and as 
to the facts concerning conception of the minor child who is the sub-
ject of these adoption proceedings. Subsequently, on the 6th day of 
May, 1977, and the 1st day of June, 1977, Orders and a Decree of Adoption 
in these proceedings were granted to DEE R. MARSDEN, the husband of 
Llie natural mother of the child, the Court having ruled that: 
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1. The Appellant had never acquired any parental rights 
in the minor child, JASON MICHAEL WRIGHT; and 
2. In the event he had acquired any parental rights, 
the same were terminated on the grounds of his abandonment. 
Appellant appeals from that Judgment granting the adoption. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS: 
On March 11, 1973, JASON MICHAEL WRIGHT was born in Salt LakE 
City, Utah, to SHERRIE LYlW ~~IGHT, now SHERRIE LYNN WRIGHT MARSDEN, 
an unmarried 14-year-old girl. The Appellant, JOHN WAYNE COX, was 
23 years old at the time of that birth. All doctor and hospital ex-
pense arisin> •'u" of the birth of JASON MICHAEL I.JRIGHT were paid by 
SHERRIE LYNN WRIGHT'S parents and the Appellant did not contribute to 
the payment of any bills incurred by the birth of JASON MICHAEL WRIGHT. 
Subsequent to the birth of said child, JOHN WAYNE COX spent a short 
period of time in the United States Marine Corps; and while in the 
corps and stationed overseas, Mr. COX sent flowers to SHERRIE LYNN 
WRIGHT and wrote several letters to her. These letters were limited 
to inquires about SHERRIE; no inquiry was every made as to the health 
and welfare of JASON MICHAEL WRIGHT. After leaving the military, 
JOHN WAYNE COX returned to Salt Lake City, Utah, in early 1974; and, 
in the three years thdt have elapsed since that time, JOHN WAYNE COX 
has contacted SHERRIE LYNN WRIGHT only on one occasion, and that for 
the purpose of inquiring as to her personal welfare; and has contribute 
no monies towards the support of JASO~ NICHAEL l.JRIGHT in over three ye 
On October 26, 1974, SHERRIE LYNN h~IC:HT married DEER. nARSDE~, the 
Petitioner herein, and thev hdVE' resided to~ether sincl' th.Jt t imL' ~lon 
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3 
with JASON MICHAEL \•!RIGHT and a second child born to DEE R. and 
SHERRIE MARSDEN. On December 8, 1976, DEE R. MARSDEN filed a Pe-
tition for Adoption of JASON MICHAEL WRIGHT. The final Decree of 
Adoption was entered in this matter on the 1st day of June, 1977. 
ARGUMENT: 
POINT I: 
That the District Court properly applied the law in ruling 
that JOHN WAYNE COX never acquired any rights by being the fater, 
either by statute and/or by common law. 
The criminal statute which applied at the time that JOHN 
WAYNE COX took sexual liberties with SHERRIE LYNN WRIGHT is S 76-53-19, 
U.C.A., 1953, as amended. That statute was construed and interpreted 
in STATE v. HUNTSMAN, 115 Utah 283; 204 P.2d 448, as fixing the age 
of consent. The Court indicated that, where a statute makes it 
either rape or carnal knowledge to have illicit sexual intercourse 
with a female under a specified age without any provision regarding 
her consent, such statute fixes the age of consent. The Court 
further stated that the purpose of such statute establishing the age 
of consent is to protect young girls from illicit acts of the 
opposite sex. STATE v. HUNTSMAN, supra. 
The next preceding statute, S 76-53-18, U.C.A., 1953, 
as amended, states: 
Penalty.-Rape is punishable as follows: 
(3) When the female upon whom the act is committed is 
under the age of thirteen years, by imprisonment in the 
,r~te prison. for a term which shall not be less than 
tw~nty years and which may be for life. 
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(b) In all other cases, by imprisonment in the state 
prison not less than ten years. 
There was given a definition of rape in U.C.A., 1953, 
as amended, S 76-53-15, as follows: 
"Rape" defined.~Rape is an act of sexual inter-
course accomplished with a female, not the wife of the 
perpetrator, under any of the following circumstances: 
(1) When the female is under the age of thirteen years. 
(2) When she is incapable, through lunacy or any 
other unsoundness of mind, whether temporary or perman-
ent, of giving legal consent. 
(3) Where she resists, but her resistance is over-
come by force or violence. 
(4) Where she is prevented from resisting by threats 
of immediate and great bodily harm, accompanied by 
apparent power of execution, or by any intoxicating, 
narcotic or anesthetic substance administered by or 
with the privity of thE ~cused. 
(5) When she is at th le unconscious of the nature 
of the act, and this ~wn to the accused. 
(6) Wheorc she submits Jnder the belief that the person 
committing the act is her husband, and this belief is 
induced by any artificate, pretense or concealment 
practiced by the accused with the intent to induce 
such belief. 
Utah, therefore, had a rather unusual grouping of sex 
offenses which provided for two degrees of statutory rape; the 
first being defined specifically as rape where it occurred under 
any of the circumstances described in S 76-53-15, supra; and the 
second, called carnal knowledge, when it occurred under any of 
th~ circumstances specified in ~ 76-53-19, supra. In either in-
stance, the age of consent was 18 years. Prior to the age of 
18, a woman was not deemed to be able to consent to any act of 
illicit sexual intercourse. STATE \'. HUNTSHAN, supra. 
In 65 ArnJur 2d, Rape, ~ 19, it is stated, "1n jurisdic-
tions \Vhere a statute defines the cr lme as a.n al·t nf sexu~ll inter-
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course with any female without indicating whether the absence of mar-
riage is or is not an essential element of the offense. It has been 
held that the fact that the female was married or had been married did 
not make her capable of legally consenting to the sexual act; and, thus, 
her marriage is no defense to the crime of statutory rape committed 
by another than her husband if she is under the age of 18. STATE v. 
HUNTSMAN, supra. 
Basically, what our legislature has done is to create two 
levels or degrees of statutory rape; that upon a child under the age 
of 13 and that upon a child between the ages of 13 and 18, setting 
different penalties for each. The mere fact that the legislature 
had designated the second as a crime of carnal knowledge made it no 
less a case of statutory rape. Thus, when JOHN WAYNE COX had illicit 
sexual intercourse with SHERRIE LYNN WRIGHT, he committed an act of 
statutory rape as defined by the statutes. 
The Appellant cites a number of cases in support of his 
proposition that Appellant acquired parental rights in and to the child, 
citing STANLEY v. ILLINOIS 405 U.S. 645, 31 LED 2nd 551, 9 U.S. Ct. 
1208 (1972), and STATE, IN THE INTEREST OF M, 25 U.2d, 101, 476 P.2d 
1013 (1970), and the change in the§ 78-30-4 U.C.A., 1953, as cited 
in THO~~S v. CHILDREN'S AID SOCIETY OF OGDEN, 12 U 2d 235, 364 P.2d 
1029 (1961). But the issue presented herein is not merely one of 
whether the father of an illegitimate child acquires any parental 
rights in and to that child, but more clearly the question of whether 
any man, guilty of raping a woman, acquires rights in an child which 
he hds, through this illicit act, created. The Utah State Legislature 
has never addressed itself to this issue and neither have our Courts. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
6 
Thus, it is a question which must be resolved by looking to the 
common law. If the child was illegitimate under the common law, 
the mother was the sole legal parent and all the rights of parent-
hood invested in her and her alone. Although this issue is not 
treated in our statutes, nor in the texts, it is the belief of 
the Respondent that to invest in a rapist any parental rights 
would result in a gross miscarriage of justice. It would be 
equivalent to saying that a thief acquired rights in rhe property 
that he steals from another. 
This Court, in THOMAS v CHILDREN'S AID SOCIETY OF OGDEN, 
supra, stated: 
The putative father of an illegitimate child occupies 
no recognized parental status at common law or under 
our statutes. The law does not recognize him at all 
except that i~ will make him pay for the child's main-
tenance if it can find out whn he is. The only father 
it recognizes as having any rights is the father of a 
legitimate child. 
Thus, this Court adopted the common law standard that the father 
of an illegitimate child acquired no rights in that child. While 
the statutes have been amended to grant certain limited rights to 
fathers of illegitimate children, nowhere in our statutes have 
those rights been extended to include a person, who through rape, 
causes the conception of a child. 
In 1975, the Utah Legislature amended § 78-30-4, Utah 
Code Annotated, 1953, the chapter on Adoption, to provide as follows: 
A person who ... claims to be the father of an illegitimate 
child may claim rights pertaining to his paternity of 
the child by registering with the Bureau of Vital StCJtis-
tics of the Division of Health, Utah Department of Social 
Services, a notice of his claim oi fLJ.lernity ... '' 
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Notwithstanding the contention of Appellant's counsel that the Utah 
Legislature wants to protect the rights of the fathers of illegitimate 
children, it is clear that the legislature's intent in amending 
§ 78-30-4 was to limit and restrict the rights of such fathers to 
complaint about adoption proceedings, requiring them to file a notice 
of their claim of paternity in order to even be entitled to a notice 
of the impending adoption hearing. This statute does not create in 
such a father any right to custody or even a right to visitation. 
Conversely, it places certain obligations on the father that must be 
met before he is entitled to claim rights, if any, to the child or 
to notice of an adoption hearing. If the father fails to file his 
claim of paternity with the State, he is absolutely precluded from 
claiming any rights to the child or from contesting the prospective 
adoption. 
It is clear, therefore, that the Appellant, JOHN WAYNE 
COX, having impregnated SHERRIE LYNN MARSDEN through an act of carnal 
knowledge, a crime equivalent to statutory rape, acquired no rights to 
the child, JASON MICHAEL WRIGHT. No such rights were recognized in 
common law and no such rights have been created by our State Legis-
lature. To rule otherwise would be to say that this man, who did the 
wrong thing at the wrong time with the wrong person, should be rewarded 
with the joys and pleasures ordinarily reserved to the law abiding 
segment of our society. 
POINT II: 
The District Court further correctly ruled that even in the 
""""t the said JOH:-l \.JAYNE COX, the Appellant herein, acquired any rights 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
8 
in the minor child, JASON MICHAEL WRIGHT; he "abandoned the child 
and forfeited any rights that he may have had." 
The standard which the Court followed in this lawsuit 
is set out in§ 78-30-5, U.C.A., 1953, as amended, as follows: 
Adoption of deserted child.-A child deserted by its 
parent or parents, and having no legal guardian, may be 
adopted as in this chapter provided, without the consent 
of the parent or parents having deserted said child, 
when the district court in which the proceedings are 
pending shall determine that such child has been deserted 
by its parent or parents. Notice of proceedings for the 
determination of the fact of desertion shall be by 
personal service, publication, or posting as the court 
may direct and deem most likely to give notice to the 
parent or parents, and the court may require such fur-
ther notice of the proceedings to be given to the kin-
dred of said child as may appear to be just and 
practicable. 
Our State Legislature, seeing that desertion is difficult to prove, 
has amended that statute effective May 10, 1977, to read as 
follows: 
Consent unnecessary where parents fail to support or communi-
cate with child.-A child may be adopted without the consent 
of the parent or parents, when the district court in which 
the proceedings are pending determines, after notice to such 
parent or parents in a manner determined by the court, that 
the parent or parents, having the ability and duty to do 
so, have not provided support and have made no effort or 
only token effort without good cause to maintain a parental 
relationship with the child. It is a rebuttable presumption 
that no effort has been made if the parent or parents have 
failed to support and communicate with the child for a period 
of one year or longer. 
Thus, the Legislature has amended the adoption statute to comply 
with the judicial interpretions of other State Supreme Courts. See 
CLAUNCH v. ENTREKIN, (Alabama) 128 S. 2d 100; LANKFORD v. HOLLINGS-
WORTH, (Alabama) 219 S. 2d 387; ANON.~NON., 25 Ariz. App. 10; 
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540 P.2d 741; PETITION OF MARTINSON, (Colorado) 267 P.2d 658; KARKANEN 
v. VALDESUSO, (Colorado) 515 P.2d 128; RE: ADOPTION OF LAYTON, (Florida) 
196 S.2d 784; PETITION OF MILLER, 15 Ill.App.2d 333, 146 N.E.2d 
226; RE: ADOPTION OF HERBST, 217 Kans. 164, 535 P.2d 437; RE: CARSON, 
(Nevada) 375 P.2d 591; "B" v. "B", App.Div.2d 160, 385 N.Y.S.2d 821; 
RE: ADOPTION OF NUTTLE, 24 Misc.2d 588, 208 N.Y.S.2d 271; RE: ADOPTION 
OF ANONYMOUS, 39 Misc.2d 235, 240 N.Y.S.2d 235; RE: ADOPTION OF N., 
78 Misc.2dl05, 355 N.Y.S.2d 956; RE: ADOPTION OF JECONO, 462 Pa. 98, 
231 A.2d 295. 
Appellant relies heavily in his brief on ROBERTSON v. 
HUTCHINSON, 560 P.2d 1110 (1977). The Court should note some substantial 
factual differences between ROBERTSON v. HUTCHINSON and the instant 
case. In ROBERTSON v. HUTCHINSON, the children were legitimate child-
ren of a marriage between Mr. ROBERTSON and Mrs. HUTCHINSON. Mrs. 
HUTCHINSON had been seriously injured in 1971 and was hospitalized 
outside of the State of Utah. In that case, Mrs. HUTCHINSON was deter-
mined not to have abandoned her children. In the present case, Mr. 
COX was outside of the State of Utah by his own choosing, seeking to 
avoid prosecution for a crime which he admittedly committed. Mr. 
COX also was involved in an accident that occurred in the State of Utah 
and was in the State of Utah after April, 1974, yet took no action 
to visit the child or pay any support for him. He filed no legal 
document to provide for the support of the child, other than the acknow-
ledgment of paternity with the Bureau of Vital Statistics. This 
merely was acknowledgment that he iLtended, at some unknown time, to 
do something for the child; but he took no affirmative action in 
this matter until the Petition for Adoption was filed. Counsel relies 
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in the minor child, JASON MICHAEL WRIGHT; he "abandoned the child 
and forfeited any rights that he may have had." 
The standard which the Court followed in this lawsuit 
is set out in § 78-30-5, U.C.A., 1953, as amended, as follows: 
Adoption of deserted child.-A child deserted by its 
parent or parents, and having no legal guardian, may be 
adopted as in this chapter provided, without the consent 
of the parent or parents having deserted said child, 
when the district court in which the proceedings are 
pending shall determine that such child has been deserted 
by its parent or parents. Notice of proceedings for the 
determination of the fact of desertion shall be by 
personal service, publication, or posting as the court 
may direct and deem most likely to give notice to the 
parent or parents, and the court may require such fur-
ther notice of the proceedings to be given to the kin-
dred of said child as may appear to be just and 
practicable. 
Our State Legislature, seeing that desertion is difficult to prove, 
has amended that statute effective May 10, 1977, to read as 
follows: 
Consent unnecessary where parents fail to support or communi-
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of the parent or parents, when the district court in which 
the proceedings are pending determines, after notice to such 
parent or parents in a manner determined by the court, that 
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so, have not provided support and have made no effort or 
only token effort without good cause to maintain a parental 
relationship with the child. It is a rebuttable presumption 
that no effort has been made if the parent or parents have 
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of one year or longer. 
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with the judicial interpretions of other State Supreme Courts. See 
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540 P.2d 741; PETITION OF MARTINSON, (Colorado) 267 P.2d 658; KARKANEN 
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196 S.2d 784; PETITION OF MILLER, 15 Ill.App.2d 333, 146 N.E.2d 
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HUTCHINSON, 560 P.2d 1110 (1977). The Court should note some substantial 
factual differences between ROBERTSON v. HUTCHINSON and the instant 
case. In ROBERTSON v. HUTCHINSON, the children were legitimate child-
ren of a marriage between Mr. ROBERTSON and Mrs. HUTCHINSON. Mrs. 
HUTCHINSON had been seriously injured in 1971 and was hospitalized 
outside of the State of Utah. In that case, Mrs. HUTCHINSON was deter-
mined not to have abandoned her children. In the present case, Mr. 
COX was outside of the State of Utah by his own choosing, seeking to 
avoid prosecution for a crime which he admittedly committed. Mr. 
COX also was involved in an accident that occurred in the State of Utah 
and was in the State of Utah after April, 1974, yet took no action 
to visit the child or pay any support for him. He filed no legal 
document to provide for the support of the child, other than the acknow-
ledgment of paternity with the Bureau of Vital Statistics. This 
merely was acknowledgment that he iLtended, at some unknown time, to 
do something for the child; but he took no affirmative action in 
this matter until the Petition for Adoption was filed. Counsel relies 
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10 
heavily on the Appellant's poverty as a reason for not taking 
affirmative action; yet Appellant is now, as he could have been 
then, represented by Salt Lake County Legal Services. 
A parent's right or interest jn or to the custody 
of an infant child is in the nature of a trust which imposes upon 
him a reciprocal obligation to maintain, care for, and protect 
the child; and the law secures him in this right so long as he 
shall discharge the correlative duties and obligations and no 
longer (emphasis added), 2 ArnJur 2d, Adoption, § 29. At no time 
during the course of the lifetime of this minor child has the 
Appellant shown any interest in performing the obligations to 
maintain, care '_, •.'r protect the minor child. In fact, Mr. COX 
totally has abbregated the trust reposed in him by the law; and his 
parental rights, if any, were rightfully terminated by the Court 
below. As noted in 2 ArnJur 2d, Adoption, § 31, " ... (W)hen it is 
satisfactorily established that the parent has in fact abandoned 
or deserted the child the adoption may be allowed not only without 
the consent of the parents but even against their opposition." 
There has been, by this Appellant, a conscious disregard of the 
obligations owed by a parent to a child. See STATE IN INTEREST 
OF SUMHERS CHILDREN v. WOLFFENSTEIN, 560 P2d 331 (1977). 
In WOLFFENSTEIN, a father who had been found to have 
abandoned his children by the Juvenile Court, appealed and the Utah 
Supreme Court aff- Jed the finding of abandonment by the Juvenile 
Court. In HOLFFENSTEIN, the Appelldnt was found to lwve abandoned 
his children under § 55-10-109 (l)b, Utah Code ~•notated, 1953; 
and, upon appeal to the Utah Supreme Court, the Appc· 1 L111t urged 
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that "abandonment" should be interpreted and applied under § 55-10-109 (l)b 
just as the term "desert" has been interpreted under the adoption statute 
§ 78-30-4, Utah Code Annotated, 1953. After reviewing IN RE ADOPTION OF 
WALTON, 123 U. 380, 259 P.2d 881 (1953), the Court stated as follows: 
Although we have not specifically defined abandon-
ment under the Juvenile Court Act of 1965, we have 
set forth evidence which sustained such a finding 
in State in the Interest of A, 30 Utah 2d 131, 514 
P.2d 797 (1973). There, this Court noted the children 
has spend a great part of their lives away from their 
mother, who had shown very little interest in them 
for two and one-half years. The effort she put forth 
to visit the children was nil. Her failure to mani-
fest an interest in them after losing custody, and 
to manifest a firm intention to resume physical 
custody of her children for over a period of two 
years was held sufficient to sustain a finding of 
abandonment under 55-10-109(1) (b). 
In D.M. v. State, Alaska, 515 P.2d 1234 (1973), 
a termination proceeding, the appellant, as here, 
urged a traditional definition of abandonment, 
that it imports conduct on the part of the parent 
which evidences a settled purpose to forego all 
parental duties and relinquish all parental calims 
to the child. The standard urged would require 
proof of an intent by the parent to relinquish all 
claim to a natural child in order to dissolve the 
normal legal relationship. In contrast, the State 
urged an objective standard, viz., appellant's 
intent was properly inferred from the realities 
of her conduct rather than from mere oral pro-
testation. 
We quote with approval the well-stated explanation 
of the principle. 
Whether or not there has been an 
abandonment within the meaning of 
the statute is to be determined 
objectively, taking into account not 
only the verbal expressions of the 
natural parent but their conduct as 
parents as well. The subjective intent 
standard often focuses too much atten-
tion on the parent's wishful thoughts 
and hopes for the child and too little 
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on the more important element of how 
well the parents have discharged their 
parental responsibility 
While it may well be that a sub-
jective intent is determinative when 
dealing with abandonment of personal 
property, over which the owner exer-
cises an absolute property rights, we 
believe that the relationship between 
parent and child mandates an objective 
standard of abandonment which looks to 
the parent's obligations and rights as 
well as to whether the natural bonds of 
love and affection between parent and 
child have been effectively dissolved 
by reason of parental conduct. 
A better definition of abandonment 
for these purposes, is that abandonment 
consists of conduct on the part of the 
parent which implies a conscious disre-
gard of the obligations owed by a parent 
to the child, leading to the destruction 
of the parent-child relationship. 
The Court cited as evidence to sustain the finding 
of abandonment, the mother's failure to visit or com-
municate with the child for several years, her failure 
to support the child in any way, either emotionally or 
financially, together with be long term commitment of 
the child to a foster home. The Court concluded that 
time and human nature had operated to dissolve the nor-
mal bonds between the child and his natural mother. 
The aforecited objective test was refined in In Re 
~-,Alaska, 530 P.2d 747, 749 (1975), wherein the 
court said the test focuses on two questions--Has the 
parent's conduct evidenced a conscious disregard for 
his parental obligations, and has that disregard led 
to the destruction of the parent-child relationship? 
The Utah Supreme Court, adopting the objective test set 
forth by the Alaska Supreme Court, went on to sustain the lm,er 
Court's decision in holding that: 
... the father's conduct demonstrated a conscious 
disregard of the obligations owed by a parent to 
a child, leading to the destruction of the parent-
child relationship--an abandconmf'tll. 
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Referring to the refined standard set forth in IN RE 
~., supra, where the Court stated that the test focuses on two 
questions: a) has the parent's conduct evidenced a conscious dis-
regard for his parental obligations; and, b) has that disregard lead 
to the destruction of the parent-child relationship. In the present 
case, the answer to the first question is clearly yes; and the second 
question is moot as there has never been in existence a parent-child 
relationship. The only father that JASON MICHAEL WRIGHT knows, or 
has ever known, is DEE R. MARSDEN. With respect to the possibility 
in an adoption proceeding of a conflict between a child interest and 
a parent's rights, the Utah Supreme Court, in WILSON v. PIERCE, 
14 U.2d 317, 383 P2d 925, (1963), stated as follows: 
The custody of this child being involved, a primary 
concern is for her interest and welfare; and the rights 
of contesting adults are secondary. 
The Supreme Court affirmed this stand in STATE IN INTEREST OF A., 
30 U.2d 131, 514 P2d 97 (1973), when it stated while 
... (O)ne feels deeply for a parent who is deprived 
of a child, that feeling must not overcome the duty 
placed upon the Courts to act in the best interest 
of the child. 
CONCLUSION 
The District Court ruled properly that the Appellant, being 
guilty of carnal knowledge, a near statutory rape, acquired no interest 
in the minor child, JASON MICHAEL WRIGHT, and that, in the event he 
did acquire any rights, he forfeited the same by having abandoned the 
c iii 1 d. 
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Respectfully submitted, 
r~ 
~/~ // ___ /~ \ 'j 
/WL'al/V t21~. 
' LAMBERTUS JANSEN 1 \ 
/ Attorney for Respondent \ 
: \ ) 
',~/ 
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